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INTRODUCTION
Search engines are the gatekeepers of online information. They can
direct users toward particular websites by prominently listing the websites
on the first page of a user’s search results. They can also direct users away
from other websites by hiding them in the last few pages of a user’s search
results. They can hide online content from users, either because they do
not think the website content is relevant, or because they want to hide their
competitor’s content. For example, Google has the power to return the
Zagat1 website as the first result in response to a search for “restaurant
reviews” and Yelp as the last, not because it views Yelp as less relevant,
but merely because it views Yelp as a threat to Zagat’s success.
This practice, frequently referred to as “search engine manipulation,”2
subjected Google to an almost two-year investigation by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). The FTC finally concluded the investigation in
January of 2013.3 The investigation was in large part prompted by pressure
the FTC faced from legal scholars and Google’s top competitors, primarily
Microsoft.4 These critics argued that Google engaged in anticompetitive
practices by unfairly prioritizing its own proprietary services and products
over its competitors’ when displaying search results.5 Recognizing the
significance of the matter, the FTC hired prominent outside counsel Beth
Wilkinson, a former federal prosecutor and a current partner at Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, to lead the investigation.6 Google, of course,

1. Zagat was acquired by Google in 2011. Adam Mazmanian, Google Flying High in
Travel with Frommer’s, NAT’L J. (Aug. 14, 2012, 1:47 PM),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/google-flying-high-in-travel-with-frommer-s20120814.
2. This practice may also be referred to as “search engine bias.” The two terms are
interchangeable.
3. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Agrees to Change Its Business
Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns In the Markets for Devices Like Smart
Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013) [hereinafter FTC Press
Release], available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm (discussing the close of the
investigation into anti-competitive practices of Google’s search engine and Google’s
agreement to change its business practices).
4. See Brent Kendall et al., Behind Google’s Antitrust Escape, WALL ST. J. ONLINE
(Jan. 5, 2013, 2:10 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323689604578221971197494496.html
(nothing that “Microsoft had pressed regulators to bring an antitrust case against Google”).
5. Id. There is not yet any proof, however, that Google actively lowers the PageRanks
of its competitors’ websites.
6. David Streitfeld & Edward Wyatt, U.S. Is Escalating Inquiry Studying Google’s
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2012, at A1.
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went to great lengths to defend its search engine practices, hiring First
Amendment expert and law professor Eugene Volokh to draft a white paper
defending Google search results primarily on First Amendment grounds.7
The primary legal issue concerning Google search optimization is
whether Google violates federal antitrust laws by prioritizing the websites
of its own products and services over websites of its competitors, and, if it
does, what is the proper legal remedy? This issue raises serious
constitutional issues, since search results could plausibly be considered
“speech” for First Amendment purposes.
In this Comment, I argue that, even assuming that Google prioritizes
its own websites in search results, this practice does not violate federal
antitrust laws. Furthermore, any attempt to regulate the ranking of Google
search results would violate Google’s First Amendment freedom of speech.
In Part I, I provide a primer on Google search engine results and focus on
two of Google’s most notable innovations: (1) PageRank, the system by
which Google determines the relevance of a website which, in turn,
determines the ranking in which websites appear in a particular search
query; and (2) Google OneBox, which provides users with immediate
responses to search queries at the top of a results page. Critics argue that
PageRank and Google OneBox are examples of how Google unfairly
biases its search results, hurting both competitors and consumers.8 In Part
II, I discuss the problem of search engine bias and Google’s recent FTC
settlement regarding its search engine practices. I proceed to discuss the
antitrust objection to Google search in Part III and make two points. First,
the goals of antitrust law are not fulfilled when applied to markets that
provide free goods or services, such as search engines. Second, even if a
claim were brought against Google under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
claim would fail because neither the “relevant market” nor the “willful
acquisition” elements of such a claim could be satisfied. I move on to the
First Amendment freedom of speech issue in Part IV and examine ways in
which the First Amendment has been raised as a defense of Google search
engine practices in three major cases: (1) Search King, Inc. v. Google
Tech., Inc.;9 (2) Langdon v. Google, Inc.;10 and (3) KinderStart.com LLC v.

7. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search
Engine Results (Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf. Though technically a white
paper, Professor Volokh’s paper resembled a legal brief in structure.
8. See, e.g., Adam Raff, Search but You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at
A27 (arguing that Google’s preferential placement of its own vertical search engine results
at the top of a search engine results page as opposed to competing vertical search engine
results is what has allowed Google to wipe out its competition “virtually overnight”).
9. No. CIV-02-1457-M (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
10. 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007).
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Google, Inc.11 I also discuss the “transmission theory” response to First
Amendment defenses of Google search engine rights, and argue that this
theory ultimately fails to support a denial of First Amendment rights to
search engine results. In Part V, I suggest that Google and its supporters
have been improperly characterizing what constitutes Google “speech” for
First Amendment purposes, and I conclude by proposing a new way of
interpreting Google “speech.” I argue that this new interpretation would
allow Google to claim First Amendment protection for its search engine
results, thereby dodging current proposals for government regulation and
escaping liability for antitrust allegations, as well as other state-law claims
it faces in court.
I.

A PRIMER ON GOOGLE SEARCH

One of the reasons Google has been so successful is because it has
constantly innovated the search engine industry.12 These innovations,
however, have proven to be double-edged swords. On the one hand, they
have revolutionized the way we think about searching the Internet and have
allowed users to find relevant results more easily. On the other hand, they
have subjected Google to immense litigation and even brought it under the
close monitoring of the FTC.13 Scholars and competitors have consistently
objected to these innovations as violations of federal antitrust law.14 This
section will provide a primer on two of Google’s most notable, yet
controversial, innovations: PageRank and Google OneBox.
A. PageRank
In order to deliver relevant search results to its users, Google uses
algorithms to determine which websites will be displayed in response to a
user’s search queries and in what order those websites will appear.15
Google algorithms rely on over two hundred signals, such as the frequency
with which the search terms occur on the website, whether the search terms
11. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006).
12. For a list of some of Google’s most notable innovations in the search engine
industry, see infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
13. The FTC investigated Google search engine practices for almost two years before
finally settling in January 2013. See FTC Press Release, supra note 3 (discussing the FTC
investigation).
14. See, e.g., id. (illustrating competitors’ objections, primarily Microsoft’s, to Google’s
search engine practices); Raff, supra note 8 (criticizing Google as being anti-competitive by
promoting its own products in search engine results).
15. Facts About Google and Competition, GOOGLE,
www.google.com/competition/howgooglesearchworks.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2013)
[hereinafter Facts About Google and Competition].
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appear in the title, and whether synonyms of the search terms appear on the
page.16 Google’s most famous algorithm is PageRank, named after Larry
Page—co-founder and CEO of Google.17
PageRank helps determine the relative importance of a website, which
then determines where in a search engine results page (SERP) the website
will appear.18 To determine the PageRank of a website, Google accounts
for various factors, such as title tag,19 keywords, and the number and
importance of links pointing to a website.20 Using these factors, PageRank
ranks the “relevance” of a website on a scale from one through ten, with ten
being the most relevant.21 In short, the higher the PageRank of a website,
the more prominently the website is displayed in search results. Websites
with the highest PageRank will appear at the top of a SERP, whereas
websites with the lowest PageRank will appear on the last of several
SERPs, or will sometimes not appear at all. PageRank counts the number
and quality of links to a page in order to determine the importance of a
website.22 The theory behind PageRank is that if Page A links to Page B,
then Page A’s link indicates that Page B is a relevant page.23 Thus, the
more frequently other websites link to a page, the higher that page’s
PageRank will be. Although Google sells advertisement placement, it does
not sell PageRank.24 In other words, a website cannot pay Google to
increase its PageRank or to decrease the PageRank of other websites.
Many critics accuse Google of manipulating its search results to

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. For an excellent primer on PageRank, see CHRIS RIDINGS & MIKE SHISHIGIN,
PAGERANK UNCOVERED (Jill Whalen & Yuri Baranov eds., 3d ed. 2002), available at
http://www.voelspriet2.nl/PageRank.pdf. For Google’s own explanation of its search
results, see Facts About Google and Competition, supra note 15.
19. “Title tag” is a hidden HTML code on a website and is considered to be one of the
most important factors in achieving high search engine rankings. The title tag of a webpage
appears at the top of the browser toolbar when the page is loaded and is also displayed in
search-engine results. Additionally, the title page code provides a title for the page when it
is added to a user’s “favorites.” For more information on title tags, see James A. Ross,
Protection for Trademark Owners: The Ultimate System of Regulating Search Engine
Results, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 295, 314-15 (2002).
20. RIDINGS & SHISHIGIN, supra note 18, at 3.
21. On rare occasions, a website can receive a PageRank of zero. See, e.g., KinderStart
I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 20–21 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (discussing the plaintiff’s
claim against Google arguing, inter alia, that his website’s PageRank score of “zero”
constituted defamation).
22. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, slip op. at 2 (W.D.
Okla. May 27, 2003) (“The PageRank is derived from a combination of factors that include
text-matching and the number of links from other web sites that point to the PageRanked
web site.”).
23. RIDINGS & SHISHIGIN, supra note 18, at 3.
24. Search King, Inc., slip op. at 2.
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benefit its own products and services, and these criticisms usually target
PageRank.25 For example, as of October 28, 2013, a Google search for
“maps” produces Google Maps as its first search result. Critics argue that
Google unfairly prioritizes its own products and services, such as Google
Maps, over the products and services of its competitors, such as MapQuest
and Bing Maps, by listing its own services first.26 The critics argue that this
practice deceives the public into believing that Google’s products and
services are objectively more relevant and therefore superior, driving
Google’s competitors out of business.27 On the other hand, Google
counters that search manipulation allows Google to deliver more relevant
results, and it denies unfairly prioritizing its own products over others’.28
Google is not alone in this regard. Most search engines are guilty of
search engine manipulation,29 since it is through this manipulation that
search engines are able to produce relevant results.30 In lawsuits
challenging search engine manipulation, plaintiffs often seek search engine
algorithms during discovery, but such algorithms usually are protected as
trade secrets.31

25. See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access,
Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1183-84
(arguing that if Google assigned a higher PageRank to all YouTube videos than those on
any competitor websites, such as MySpace or Veoh, users unaware of the Google-YouTube
merger could believe that YouTube videos earned high rankings because of their relevance,
rather than because Google was promoting its own product).
26. Id. Interestingly enough, however, a Google search for “email,” as of October 28,
2013, produces Yahoo! e-mail as the first search result. Google’s own e-mail service,
Gmail, only appears after Yahoo! as the third search result. Perhaps even more interesting
is a Google search for “search engine.” As of October 28, 2013, the first search result is a
Wikipedia entry and the second result is Dogpile. Google.com does not even appear on the
first page of search results.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 8 and 25.
28. Facts About Google and Competition, supra note 15 (boasting that Google search
algorithms are “designed to improve the user experience by catching and demoting lowquality sites that [do] not provide useful original content or otherwise add much value . . .
[and providing] better rankings for high-quality sites . . . .”). Scholars also argue that
Google manipulation of its search results is beneficial because it creates more personalized
searches that produce more relevant results. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias
and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188 (2006) (discussing
the benefits of Google search engine manipulation and the consequences of government
regulation of search engine results).
29. For more background information on search engine bias, see Bracha & Pasquale,
supra note 25, at 1167-71.
30. Goldman, supra note 28, at 189 (arguing that all search engine results are biased).
31. Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 201, 233 (2006) (“[A]lgorithms of search engines are generally trade
secrets . . . .”).
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B. Google OneBox
Google OneBox is one of Google’s more innovative improvements to
the search engine industry. In response to a search query, Google will
often list a direct response to entered search terms at the very top of a
SERP, as opposed to the traditional list of blue hyperlinks.32 Google
OneBox comes in many forms and is best explained through illustrations.
For example, when I enter “map of New York” into the Google search bar,
a map of New York powered by Google Maps appears at the very top of
my search results.33 That map is an example of a Google OneBox result.34
When I click on the map, I am directed to Google Maps, where a map of
New York appears with options to search for directions or nearby
restaurants.35 When I enter a ticker symbol into the Google search bar,
such as “aapl,” I see live quotes and information from Google Finance
relating to Apple stock.36 That box of stock information is an example of a
Google OneBox result. Google OneBox differs from general search results
because it provides a direct response to a search query, as opposed to a
simple hyperlink that one must click to then find a response to a search
query.
However, Google OneBox should not be confused with the
“Knowledge Panel,” another one of Google’s search innovations. The
Knowledge Panel differs from Google OneBox because the Knowledge
Panel contains fragments of content scraped from other websites, such as
Wikipedia or IMDB. For example, when I enter the movie title “My
Cousin Vinny” into the Google search bar, images from the movie along
with general information about the movie appear in a box on the right-hand
side of the screen.37 That box of images and general information is an
example of a Knowledge Panel. Google simply compiles this content into
a box, known as the Knowledge Panel.38 Google OneBox content, on the
other hand, is purely produced by Google. It usually comes in the form of

32. Google OneBox Results, GOOGLE (July 9, 2006),
http://googlesystem.blogspot.com/2006/07/google-onebox-results.html.
33. Search for “map of New York,” GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (enter “map of
New York” into the search bar, then click “Google Search”) (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
34. See supra note 32.
35. See GOOGLE, supra note 33.
36. Search for “aapl,” GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (enter “aapl” into the search
bar, then click “Google Search”) (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
37. Search for “My Cousin Vinny,” GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (enter “My
Cousin Vinny” into the search bar, then click “Google Search”) (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
38. For more information on the Knowledge Panel, see Amir Efrati, Google Gives
Search a Refresh, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2012, at B1. See also The Knowledge Graph,
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/features/search/knowledge.html (discussing
Google’s Knowledge Graph, which is another name for the Knowledge Panel).
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a direct response to a search query.
The image below illustrates the difference between Google OneBox
and the Knowledge Panel by displaying results from a Google search for
“aapl.”39 The box at the top left corner of the image that shows data for
Apple stock is an example of a Google OneBox result. This contains data
taken from one of Google’s own vertical search engines, Google Finance.
In contrast, the box at the top right-hand corner of the image is an example
of a Knowledge Panel. This Knowledge Panel contains data Google has
scraped from other content on the web, such as the Wikipedia entry for
Apple Inc.

Google OneBox results often take a user to one of Google’s many
vertical search engines. A vertical search engine is a specialized search
engine that indexes only a specific segment of content on the web.40
Examples of vertical search engines on Google are Google Finance, Google
Maps, Google News, YouTube, and Google+ Places. Examples of nonGoogle vertical search engines are Yelp, MapQuest, Expedia, and
Travelocity.
Although Google OneBox results may seem quite helpful to users,
critics argue that Google OneBox is an anticompetitive tool that Google
uses to prioritize its own vertical search products over competing
products.41 For example, when I enter “directions from New York to
39. GOOGLE, supra note 36.
40. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The
Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 202 (2011).
41. .See, e.g., Raff, supra note 8 (arguing that Google’s preferential placement of its
own vertical search engine results at the top of a SERP as opposed to vertical search engine
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Boston,” a Google Map of the route from New York to Boston appears at
the very top of the page.42 A link to a MapQuest map of the same route
appears farther down the page, below the Google Map.43 Additionally,
unlike the Google Map, the MapQuest link does not include an image of
the route.44 Thus, most searchers entering these search terms would click
on the Google Map link of the route as opposed to the MapQuest link,
because the Google Map link is (1) more prominent and (2) more
convenient to click on, given that the map is embedded into the actual
search results page. Furthermore, since Google advertises that it returns
more relevant links at the top of a SERP,45 a user may believe that since the
Google Map appears at the top, before the MapQuest map, the Google Map
must be more “relevant” to their search. Competitors object that this
practice drives them out of the market.46
II.

THE PROBLEM OF SEARCH ENGINE MANIPULATION

The best and worst thing about the Internet is the breadth of its
content. Search engines provide value by indexing all of the content in a
way that makes the Internet manageable and useful. Instead of browsing
through hundreds of websites to find exactly what is sought, search engines
allow users to enter search terms that filter out irrelevant content through
the use of search terms. The search engine returns only websites relating to
those search terms. To do this, however, each search engine must decide
how to determine what is relevant and what is not.47 This necessarily
involves a ranking of websites the search engine deems relevant and a
results of its competitors is what has allowed Google to wipe out its competition).
42. Search for “directions from New York to Boston,” GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com (enter “directions from New York to Boston” into the search bar,
then click “Google Search”) (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Facts About Google and Competition, supra note 15 (“[Google] algorithms attempt
to rank the most relevant search results towards the top of the page, and less relevant search
results lower down the page.”).
46. See, e.g., Complaint at 3-4, TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d
370 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 1400(SHS)), 2009 WL 455244 [hereinafter TradeComet
Complaint] (alleging that Google drove the plaintiff out of business by decreasing its
prominence on Google’s platform because Google viewed the plaintiff as a dangerous
competitor).
47. See, e.g., Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1163-64 (“Search engines play a
crucial role in managing the enormous amount of information available on the Internet.
They help users locate the information most relevant and important to them and lead an
audience (and interlocutors) to content providers.”); Goldman, supra note 28, at 189
(“[S]earch engines make editorial choices designed to satisfy their audience. These choices
systematically favor certain types of content over others, producing a phenomenon called
‘search engine bias.’”).
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filtering out of websites the search engine deems irrelevant.48 In this way,
search engines have become the gatekeepers of information: They direct us
toward what they think is relevant and away from what they do not think is
relevant.
A. The Impact On Competitors
Search engine bias creates significant opportunity for abuse. Search
engine operators such as Google and Microsoft have the power to
manipulate search results in ways that serve their own company’s
interests.49 A search engine’s algorithm can lower the ranking of a website
simply because the search engine operator views it as competition or
because it has a personal distaste for the website.50 For example, Google
can give a high PageRank to Zagat, allowing it to appear at the top of a
SERP, and Google can give a low PageRank to Yelp, pushing Yelp’s
website down to the bottom of a SERP. Absent a clear notice to the user, it
may appear as if websites that are pushed to the bottom of a SERP, like
Yelp, are less relevant and not worth visiting.51 This type of conduct can
significantly decrease the traffic to that website and has the potential to
force the website operator to shut down. One reporter has argued that this
biased ranking is how Google Maps unseated MapQuest from its
dominance in online mapping services “virtually overnight.”52
B. The Impact On Consumers
In addition to the effect search engine bias has on competitors’
business, search engine bias also has a significant effect on users. As the
gatekeepers of the Internet, search engines are able to control what
information reaches the user and what does not. Professors Bracha and
Pasquale have argued that exercise of this control can significantly
diminish the autonomy of the search engine’s users.53 For example, if a

48. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1168.
49. Id. at 1170 (“[S]earch engines can and, to some extent, do manipulate results in
order to serve their own self-interest.”).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Letter from Gary Ruskin, Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert, to Donald Clark,
Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n (June 27, 2002), at 1, available at
http://www.commercialalert.org/PDFs/ftcresponse.pdf (explaining receipt of a complaint
alleging that Google’s search engine bias “may mislead search engine users to believe that
search results are based on relevancy alone, not marketing ploys”).
52. Raff, supra note 8 (“The preferential placement of Google Maps helped it unseat
MapQuest from its position as America’s leading online mapping service virtually
overnight.”).
53. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1176-77.
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user enters “same-sex marriage” into a Google search and most of the
results returned are websites in favor of same-sex marriage, a user might
believe this means that more people support same-sex marriage than
oppose it.54 If a user enters “do violent video games cause gun violence
among youth” into a Google search and most of the results returned are
websites that suggest “yes,” a user might believe this means that violent
video games do, in fact, cause violence among youth. By lowering the
PageRank of these websites, Google has the power to turn users away from
websites citing studies that suggest “no,” violent video games do not cause
gun violence among youth. Manipulating search engine results in the way
potentially allows search engine operators, like Google, to impact users’
beliefs.
C. The FTC Settlement
After almost twenty months of investigating Google’s search practices
for antitrust violations, the FTC issued a press release on January 3, 2013,
announcing that it had reached a settlement with Google and that the FTC
would cease its investigation into the company.55 After sifting through the
evidence, the FTC concluded that Google’s search algorithms, “even those
that may have had the effect of harming individual competitors—could be
plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google’s product and the
experience of its users.”56 Furthermore, it concluded that condemning
legitimate product improvements such as those Google made would risk
harming consumers:
Challenging Google’s product design decisions in this case
would require the Commission—or a court—to second-guess a
firm’s product design decisions where plausible precompetitive
justifications have been offered, and where those justifications
are supported by ample evidence. Based on this evidence, we do
not find Google’s business practices with respect to the claimed
search
bias
to
be,
on
balance,
demonstrably
anticompetitive . . . .57

54. Given the way PageRank has been explained to the public—as prioritizing websites
that are more frequently linked to over websites less frequently visited—a user could infer
(accurately or inaccurately) that the top websites on a search engine results page are the
most frequently visited websites, and may therefore infer that more people are in favor of
same-sex marriage than opposed to it. See supra Part I.A (explaining PageRank).
55. FTC Press Release, supra note 3.
56. Id.
57. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices,
In the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), at 2-3,
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf [hereinafter FTC Statement].
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After the settlement, Microsoft and other Google critics exploded and
labeled the investigation “weak and frankly—unusual.”58
Although it may seem as if Google is safe now that the FTC has ruled
in its favor, the battle continues. Critics continue lobbying against Google
and pressuring the government to take action.59 Google remains under
investigation by several other entities, such as: the European Union; the
South Korean Fair Trade Commission; Brazil’s Justice Ministry; and the
Attorney Generals of Texas, New York, California, Ohio, Mississippi, and
Oklahoma.60 Additionally, private parties have continued to file suit
against Google for violating state antitrust and consumer protection laws.61
This makes it a more critical time than ever to examine the objections to
Google’s search practices and proposed solutions to search engine bias.
III.

THE ANTITRUST OBJECTION

The crux of the FTC investigation into Google was determining
whether or not Google manipulated its search results in ways that constitute
anticompetitive conduct in violation of the Sherman Act.62 In this section, I
argue that the goals of antitrust law are not achieved when applied to
markets that provide free goods or services, such as search engines.
Additionally, I argue that even if the Sherman Act applies to Google
searches, Google would escape liability because there is no “relevant
market” that can be alleged for purposes of the Sherman Act, and Google
does not “willfully acquiesce” in its monopoly share by engaging in
anticompetitive conduct. Rather, Google enjoys an increased market share
because of a superior product and its numerous innovations in the search
engine industry.63

58. Dave Heiner, The FTC and Google: A Missed Opportunity, MICROSOFT ON THE
ISSUES (Jan. 3, 2013, 4:27 P.M.), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/
archive/2013/01/03/the-ftc-and-google-a-missed-opportunity.aspx. Dave Heiner is the Vice
President and Deputy General Counsel of Microsoft.
59. See, e.g., id. (expressing the hope that other antitrust agencies will succeed where
Heiner believes the FTC has failed, and “obtain the additional relief needed to address the
serious competition law concerns that remain,” regarding Google’s conduct).
60. Global Scrutiny: Law Enforcement Agencies Around the World Are Investigating
Google, FAIRSEARCH 2 http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/globalscrutiny.pdf; see also Microsoft Pressures Europe After FTC Google Verdict, CNBC (Jan.
4, 2013, 10:57 A.M.), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100354398 (summarizing Dave Heiner’s
criticisms of the FTC’s verdict regarding Google’s alleged antitrust violations, and
Microsoft’s subsequent focus on the investigations being conducted in Europe).
61. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, SMS Telecom LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 6:12-cv00987 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2013) (alleging, inter alia, fraud, deceptive trade practices, and
unfair competition).
62. FTC Statement, supra note 57.
63. For examples of some of these innovations, see infra text accompanying notes 71-
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A. The Goals of the Federal Antitrust Laws
The Sherman Act makes it unlawful to monopolize, attempt to
monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any given market.64 It is generally
accepted that the purpose of antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act is to
maximize “consumer welfare.”65 Monopolies hurt consumer welfare in two
ways. First, monopolies drive up prices.66 If there is only one seller of a
product, the seller can increase the price of the product and consumers will
be forced to pay whatever is demanded (or suffer without the product,
which is not always an option) because there are no lower priced
alternatives. Second, monopolies hurt innovation.67 If there is only one
seller of a product, that seller has little incentive to innovate or to improve
the product because the seller does not have to worry about a competing
product.
Neither of the foregoing reasons supports the application of the
Sherman Act to Google’s search engine practices. First, assuming Google
has a monopoly over the search engine market, there is no harm to
consumer welfare through an increase of prices, since Google search
services are free.68
Second, there is no empirical evidence that Google’s domination of
the search engine market has harmed innovation within that market.69
Monopolies are thought to hurt innovation because if a company were the
only seller of a product, the company would not have to improve the
product to compete.70 However, this is not the case in the search engine
market, where companies like Google offer their services for free.
Additionally, the status quo shows that despite Google’s dominance in

77.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
65. KEVIN COATES, COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 10
(2011).
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911)
(describing the “danger of deterioration in quality” of a monopolized product).
68. Of course, Google’s opponents are quick to assert that not all of Google’s services
are free. For example, Google has several “customers” who pay for advertisements on
Google so that their websites will appear prominently in Google search engine results.
However, these are customers not of the online search market, but of the search advertising
market, which has failed as a “relevant market” for antitrust purposes because it is
indistinguishable from general online advertising. This is more thoroughly discussed a few
paragraphs below in my discussion of KinderStart.com LLC v. Google.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 71–77 (discussing several Google innovations
developed while it enjoyed a dominant market share of the search engine industry).
70. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 22 U.S. at 1 (evaluating the anticompetitive practices
of a large petroleum company and concluding that they amounted to a conspiracy to
monopolize the oil industry).
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the search engine industry, innovation in the market has not ceased. For
example, on December 7, 2009, Google introduced “Google Goggles,”
which allows Android phones to search the web by taking a picture of an
object instead of typing in words.71 Less than a year later, Google
introduced “Google Instant,” which displays search results as you type,
even before your terms are fully entered.72 In 2011, Google introduced
“Google Voice Search,” which allows users to search the web by speaking
search terms into a microphone instead of typing in words.73 In early 2012,
Google introduced personalized searches, which allow users to personalize
their searches when signed into a Google account.74 Only a few months
later, Google introduced “Handwrite,” which allows users to search on a
tablet or smartphone by writing search terms with their fingers as opposed
to entering them on a keyboard.75 Most recently, Google introduced
“Google Now,” which collects a user’s search history and, based off of the
user’s search habits, delivers personalized information to the user.76 All of
these search engine innovations were developed in a short span of three to
four years, and do not even begin to cover all of the innovations Google has
brought to the search engine industry.
The underlying purpose of federal antitrust laws—to prevent price
hikes and to encourage innovation—simply does not map onto the complex
search engine industry, and enforcement of these laws would not achieve
the goal of improving consumer welfare. In fact, some commentators have
suggested that applying federal antitrust laws to Google may even hinder
innovation, thereby hurting consumer welfare. For example, less than a
year after the FTC ended its antitrust investigation into Google, Google
launched a new search algorithm called “Hummingbird,” which has been
referred to as “the biggest search change in a decade.”77 This recent
innovation might not have been possible had the FTC pursued an antitrust
case against Google, as the burden of having to have its decisions approved
71. Katie Lepi, The Evolution of Google Search Over The Past 5 Years, EDUDEMIC
(Jan. 7, 2013), http://edudemic.com/2013/01/the-evolution-of-google-search/.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. For a video introducing Google Handwrite, see Google, Handwrite, a new way
to search on Google, YOUTUBE (July 26, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uyeJXK
fAcpc.
76. For more information about “Google Now,” see Google Now. The right information
at just the right time, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/landing/now/ (last visited Sept. 3,
2013). For a reporter’s commentary on “Google Now,” see Claire Cain Miller, Addicted to
Apps, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, at SR3.
77. Gordon Crovitz, Google Search: Regulation Yields to Innovation, WALL ST. J., Oct.
7, 2013, at A15 (arguing that it is no coincidence that Google was able to launch one of the
biggest innovations to its search engine in the same year that the FTC ceased investigating it
for anticompetitive practices).
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by regulators could have convinced Google to not pursue Hummingbird.78
B. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
The main source of antitrust law cited in objections to Google’s search
engine practices is section 2 of the Sherman Act, which makes it unlawful
for a company to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce” in the United States.79 To prevail on a section 2
monopolization claim, two elements must be established: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident.80 Neither one of these elements is met in the case against
Google search.
1. Monopoly Power in the Relevant Market
Although there are no strict numbers dictating what constitutes a
monopoly in a given market, courts have estimated that a market share
between seventy and ninety percent suggests monopoly power.81 Whether
or not Google possesses monopoly power by this standard in a market is
not in serious dispute.82 The critical issue lies in determining what

78. See id. (pointing to the stifling of innovation that occurred at IBM after antitrust
cases were brought against it).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
80. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
81. See United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
that 75% to 80% market share of a dental supply manufacturer on a revenue basis was
“more than adequate to establish a prima facie case of [monopoly] power”); Exxon Corp. v.
Berwick Bay Real Estate Partners, 748 F.2d 937, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(finding that a 52% share of the market was “an insufficient basis as a matter of law,” to
prove that a major oil company was guilty of antitrust violations); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that a 90% market
share “is enough to constitute a monopoly”). It is typically required that a monopolist
foreclose at least 40% of the relevant market before antitrust liability can be found. See,
e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984) (finding that a hospital
with 30% of the relevant market share did not possess sufficient market power for antitrust
liability purposes).
82. Roughly 65% to 70% of all Internet searches on computers in the United States are
done through Google. The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening
Competition?: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and
Consumer Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6-7 (2011) (statement of Sen.
Herb Kohl). Roughly 95% of all mobile device searches are done on Google. Id. In second
place, Microsoft’s Bing accounts for around 15% of Internet searches in the U.S., with
Yahoo in a close third, accounting for 14% of Internet searches in the United States.
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“relevant market” is at stake. Defining the “relevant market” is critical in
antitrust cases because it often determines the outcome of the case.83 A
“relevant market” for purposes of a section 2 claim is defined as “the field
in which meaningful competition is said to exist.”84
Citing the large number of searches conducted on Google as opposed
to other search engines, Google opponents often breeze through the
analysis of what the “relevant market” is. For example, FairSearch, a
coalition of businesses and organizations devoted to fostering competition
and fair practices in online search, published a report arguing that Google
search violates section 2 of the Sherman Act.85 The report devoted most of
its analysis to the collection of data showing how many searches are done
on Google as opposed to other search engines, while giving little to no
analysis on what constitutes the “relevant market.”86 Instead, the report
simply asserted that Google’s monopoly exists in the “Internet search and
search advertising” markets.87
Failing to define the relevant market might cause a section 2 claim to
fail. New innovations in online search and search advertising have
complicated the search engine market.88 Given that the allegation is that
Google manipulates its search engine results by prioritizing its own
products and services over those of its competitors, the “relevant market” at
stake is the search engine market, not the search advertising market.89 This
failure to pinpoint the precise “relevant market” for section 2 purposes is
the reason KinderStart, an Internet website that served as a directory and
search engine linking to resources on subjects relating to young children,
failed in its section 2 claim against Google when it tried to sue in federal
Streitfeld & Wyatt, supra note 6.
83. Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1806 (1990); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs.,
504 U.S. 451, 469 (1992) (“[M]arket definition generally determines the result of the
case.”).
84. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip
op. at 7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (quoting Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997)).
85. Google’s Transformation From Gateway to Gatekeeper: How Google’s
Exclusionary and Anticompetitive Conduct Restricts Innovation and Deceives Consumers,
FAIRSEARCH (last visited Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011
/10/Googles-Transformation-from-Gateway-to-Gatekeeper.pdf.
86. Id. at 5-14.
87. Id. at 10.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77 (discussing several of Google’s
innovations in the search engine industry).
89. Of course, there are also objections that Google opponents have made to Google
AdWords and other Google practices related to its online advertising. See, e.g., Steve Lohr,
Antitrust Cry From Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at B1 (discussing Microsoft
claims against Google, including one that Google’s contracts prohibit the use of third-party
software to move advertisers’ data from one ad platform to another).
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court.90 In fact, KinderStart alleged the same two “relevant markets” that
FairSearch did, but ultimately to no avail.91
In 2003, KinderStart enrolled in Google’s AdSense program, under
which it would pay Google for a series of sponsored links.92 Later that
year, KinderStart began placing ads from Google onto its site in exchange
for payments from Google.93 KinderStart alleged that two years later, its
website suffered a seventy percent reduction in monthly page views and
traffic.94 It subsequently realized that common search terms on Google’s
search engine no longer listed KinderStart as a result as prominently as it
had done in the past.95 As a result of this drop in search engine referrals
and prominence, KinderStart alleged that its monthly AdSense revenue
dropped by over eighty percent. KinderStart’s PageRank dropped to a
zero, the lowest ranking a website could receive.96 Having not received any
advance notice of this significant change and believing it had not violated
any of Google’s website guidelines, KinderStart filed a section 2 claim
against Google in the Northern District of California.97
Like FairSearch, KinderStart alleged that Google was guilty of
attempted monopolization in two relevant markets.98 First, it alleged that
Google owned and operated its engine in the “Search Market,” which it
claimed to be “the market of search engine design, implementation and
usage in the United States.”99 Second, KinderStart alleged that Google
dominated the “Search Ad Market,” which consisted of a “universe of
advertisers who seek and pay for online advertising” and who “target and
reach Internet browsers and users of search engines.”100
The Northern District of California rejected both theories. The
“Search Market” theory failed as a “relevant market” because Google, like
most other search engines, provides its search services free of cost, and
antitrust law does not concern itself with “competition in the provision of
free services.”101 Thus, the court held that “the Search Market [was] not a

90. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip
op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
91. Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 34, 38, KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No.
C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) [hereinafter KinderStart SAC].
92. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 4.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 3.
99. KinderStart SAC, supra note 91, ¶ 34.
100. Id. ¶ 38.
101. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip
op. at 8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
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‘[relevant] market’ for purposes of antitrust law.”102 The court also rejected
the “Search Ad Market” theory because the court was not persuaded by
KinderStart’s distinction of the Search Ad Market from other forms of
online advertising.103 Because a website can choose to engage in searchbased advertising or advertising through postings independent of any
search, the court found that search-based advertising was “reasonably
interchangeable with other forms of Internet advertising.”104 It therefore
found the Search Ad Market “too narrow” to constitute a relevant market
for antitrust purposes.105
As explained by the Northern District of California, there is no
“relevant market” that Google monopolizes or attempts to monopolize,
since the actual market at stake—the search engine market—is one where
services are provided free of cost, and antitrust law is not concerned with
competition in the provision of free services. The “search ad market”
would also fail as a relevant market because it is “too narrow” to constitute
a relevant market for antitrust purposes and is indistinguishable from other
forms of online advertising. Therefore, the first element of a Sherman Act
section 2 claim cannot be established against Google.
2. Willful Acquisition or Maintenance of Power
The second element of a section 2 claim is the willful acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power, which is to be distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product.106 This generally
requires showing that the monopoly was achieved through anticompetitive
conduct.107 This ensures that competitors who achieve monopoly power
through honest competition and a superior product will not be punished for
their success, which would have the counterproductive effect of
discouraging innovation.108

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Although not argued by KinderStart, the court also noted that the Search Market
and Search Ad Market combined together would still fail to constitute a “relevant market”
for antitrust purposes, since such a combination would “suffer from the same lack of
breadth” that renders the Search Ad Market inadequate to suffice as a “relevant market.” Id.
at 8-9.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
107. See United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (finding a monopoly
where a security company achieved its hold on the market through exclusionary practices).
108. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004) (discussing that in order to “safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession
of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.” (emphasis in original)).
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Google opponents argue that if Google demotes the ranking of its
competitors’ websites and prioritizes its own websites in its display of
search results, it willfully denies competitors of the opportunity to compete
in the market by denying them traffic they would have gotten had Google
not demoted their ranking, thereby engaging in anticompetitive conduct.109
There are two fundamental flaws with this assumption. First, Google has
no duty to its competitors.110 There is a distinction between (1) Google
taking action to promote its own product, such as returning its own vertical
search engine results at the top of a SERP (such as Google Maps), which
necessarily involves a lowering of the ranking of other non-Google
websites (such as MapQuest); and (2) Google buying out its competitors
(such as MapQuest) so that Google Maps becomes the only online map
service in the market. The first action is a legitimate, business action and
the second is an unlawful practice in violation of federal antitrust laws.111
Of course, all companies have the right to create a website for Internet
users to view. However, there is no right to have one’s website
prominently listed in the first page of a SERP on Google’s platform.112 To
argue otherwise would be as absurd as arguing that CVS would be
violating the Sherman Act if it placed its own CVS-branded over-thecounter medication prominently at the very front of the store, while burying
in the back of the store non-CVS-branded over-the-counter medication,
such as Tylenol and Excedrin. Just as CVS has the right to promote its
own products, such as by placing CVS-branded medication at the front of
its store, Google has the right to promote its own product, such as by
displaying Google Maps at the top of its search platform. The mere fact
that promoting one’s own product may have a negative business effect on
one’s competitors does not itself make the practice anticompetitive.113

109. See, e.g., TradeComet Complaint, supra note 46, at 3-4 (alleging that Google drove
the plaintiff out of business by decreasing its prominence on Google’s platform because
Google viewed the plaintiff as a dangerous competitor).
110. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 12 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (“[T]here is
no duty to aid competitors.”) (quoting MetroNet Servs., Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d
1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2004)).
111. “The law is violated only if the company tries to maintain or acquire a monopoly
through unreasonable methods.” Single Firm Conduct, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firmconduct (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
112. However, one may pay for the privilege of appearing at the top of all search results
in a “paid results” section. GOOGLE ADWORDS, http://www.google.com/adwords (last
visited Nov. 25, 2013).
113. For an action to be an impermissible anticompetitive behavior under the Sherman
Act, it must be “unreasonable.” For example, aggressive exclusionary or predatory actions
would be considered violations. AN FTC GUIDE TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 111,
at 24.
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Companies are not required to promote the products of their competitors.114
To be sure, Google theoretically could become the only search engine
in common use and Google could lower the ranking of certain websites. In
that case, the lowest rank websites could become the “unknown
unknown,”115 meaning users would never know about these websites
because they would not come up within the first few pages of search
results. Such an argument assumes that Google is the only way users can
find a website. However, websites have other advertising options. For
example, Angie’s List, a website that compiles reviews of local service
companies, advertises through TV commercials, as opposed to relying on
Google to advertise its website.116 As a result, Angie’s List has achieved
nationwide recognition, in part by relying upon sources other than Google
for advertising. The fact that some companies are unwilling to advertise
their own product, and instead choose to rely upon Google to “advertise”
their product for them, does not transform Google’s refusal to “advertise”
for them into an anticompetitive act.
This is where I diverge from other scholars that have written on the
subject, for I believe not only that Google has no obligation to list its
competitors at the top of a SERP, but I also argue that Google has no
obligation to list its competitors on a SERP at all.117 By listing a
competitor’s website as a search result, the competitor essentially is
receiving advertisement space on Google’s platform.118 Google is under no

114. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.
1986) (“[I]t is clear that a firm with lawful monopoly power has no general duty to help its
competitors . . . .”).
115. Raff, supra note 8; see also Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1178 (“Missing
results are an ‘unknown unknown[:]’ users for whom certain information is suppressed do
not even know that they do not know the information.”).
116. To view one of Angie’s List commercials, see Angie’s List TV Spot, ‘Saving Time
For Members,’ ISPOT.TV, http://www.ispot.tv/ad/7oc2/angies-list-saving-time-for-members
(last visited Sept. 3, 2013). The website for Angie’s List also lists other non-Google
companies that have assisted in its advertisement, including MSNBC, the New York Times,
Fox & Friends, and the Today Show. ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/quicktour.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
117. While there is great disagreement over whether Google must refrain from removing
its competitors from appearing at the top of a SERP, even scholars who believe Google need
not refrain from such an act believe that Google must refrain from removing its competitors
from a SERP altogether. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 94 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (proposing that many of Google’s seemingly biased search practices are
defensible but advocating close monitoring by the Federal Trade Commission of these
practices in the future).
118. Appearing as a search result in a Google search is so powerful that companies
frequently pay Google to display their website in response to search queries, though the
websites appear in a paid advertisements section on the right-hand side of the page labeled
“Ads.” GOOGLE ADWORDS, supra note 112. For example, a search for “sweaters” will
return standard search results on the left-hand side and paid search results on the right-hand
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obligation to advertise for its competitors and therefore is free to remove a
competitor entirely from appearing in particular searches on its platform, so
long as Google makes no misrepresentation claiming that it does not do so.
To return to the CVS example, not only does CVS have the right to bury
Tylenol and Excedrin medication at the back of the store while prominently
displaying CVS-branded medication at the front, CVS also has the right not
to carry Tylenol and Excedrin at all. It would be nonsensical to accuse
CVS of violating the Sherman Act simply because it refused to carry
medication sold by its competitors.
Additionally, this second element of willful acquisition or
maintenance cannot be satisfied because a company will not be penalized
under the Sherman Act for achieving monopoly power if it did so as a
result of a “superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”119
Anticompetitive conduct must be shown.120 Attempts to establish this
element against Google would fail because Google can easily claim its
success results from its superior product. Google was the first search
engine to depart from the traditional template initial search engines
followed.121 Rather than exclusively relying on algorithms to sort data and
calculate relevance, Google developed PageRank, a new formula that
accounted for the number of times other websites linked to a given page in
its determination of relevance.122 PageRank was radically different from
the formulas used by other search engines and immediately proved quite
successful, allowing Google to produce more relevant results than the
results of its competitors.123
As mentioned earlier, critics also object to Google OneBox as an
anticompetitive practice. They argue that it gives priority to Google’s own
vertical search engines over its competitors, thereby directing traffic away
from Google’s competitors and directly hurting competition.124 However,
as the FTC investigation concluded, Google OneBox is not anticompetitive
conduct; it is legitimate business conduct aimed at improving Google’s
products and services to its users.125 According to the New York Times,
Google had presented the FTC with test results from outside focus groups
hired to review different versions of Google SERPs, and the results showed
side, with “Sweaters at JCPenney” appearing as the first paid advertisement.
119. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
120. Id.
121. See Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1335-36 (2008)
(outlining Google’s rise to prominence and the ways in which its methods diverged from
those of its competitors).
122. Id. at 1337.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Raff, supra note 8 (arguing that Google’s preferential placement of its
own websites over its competitors’ websites hurts competition).
125. FTC Press Release, supra note 3.
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that more users preferred SERPs that displayed a Google OneBox result at
the top, as opposed to SERPs that did not.126 When subjects were asked to
compare side-by-side examples of a SERP with the traditional blue
hyperlinks to specialty travel sites with a SERP displaying a Google
OneBox result containing links to airlines and fares through GoogleFlights,
“fewer than one in five users preferred the page with links only.”127 Thus,
the FTC concluded that Google engaged in legitimate, business activity to
improve its product design when it determined the change to using Google
OneBox results would be better for the consumer.128 While acknowledging
that Google OneBox would have had a negative business impact on many
of Google’s competitors, the FTC found that the “totality of the evidence”
showed that “any negative impact on actual or potential competitors was
incidental . . . .”129 Google did not engage in anticompetitive conduct and
therefore did not violate the Sherman Act.
IV.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In addition to raising antitrust issues, Google search engine
manipulation also raises First Amendment issues. In this section, I first
analyze cases where plaintiffs sued Google alleging search engine
manipulation. In these cases, Google was able to escape liability on First
Amendment grounds for a wide variety of claims, including tortious
interference with contractual relationships, fraud, deceptive business
practices, and defamation. Second, I outline the “transmission theory”
response to First Amendment defenses of Google search engine practices,
and argue that this theory ultimately fails to deny Google of its First
Amendment rights.
A. How Courts Have Treated the First Amendment Issue
There are three major cases in which courts have adjudicated claims
alleging search engine manipulation by Google and Google has raised a
First Amendment defense. In all three cases, the court dismissed the
complaint.130 This section will discuss each one in turn.

126. Edward Wyatt, Critics of Google Antitrust Ruling Fault the Focus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 2013, at B1.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. FTC Statement, supra note 57, at 2.
130. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip
op. at 36-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 634–
35 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, slip op. at
8 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
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1. Search King, Inc. v. Google, Tech, Inc.
In Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech, Inc., the Western District of
Oklahoma was presented with two questions: (1) whether a representation
of the relative significance of a website is a form of protected speech, and
(2) if so, whether the search engine responsible for making these
representations is insulated from tort liability arising out of the intentional
manipulation of such a representation.131
Search King was a private company specializing in search engine
optimization. Website operators pay search engine optimizers (SEOs) such
as Search King to increase the “ranking” of their website so that their
website appears as one of the first few search results in certain search
queries. This allows websites to “game the system” by manipulating
PageRank into believing that their website is more relevant than Google’s
algorithms ordinarily would find. Search King does this by seeking out and
paying highly-ranked websites to sell advertisement placements on their
website to Search King’s clients. By increasing the number of websites
that link to one page, Search King is able to increase the ranking of their
client’s website. Therefore, by selling enough advertisement placements,
websites can pay Search King to essentially “increase” their PageRank so
that they appear higher in a SERP than they ordinarily would, thereby
bringing more traffic to their website and ultimately bringing them more
revenue.
From February 2001 until July 2002, Search King was assigned a
PageRank of seven.132 By September 2002, Search King’s PageRank had
dropped to a four.133 Search King alleged that this decrease in rank
adversely impacted its business and filed a tortious interference with
contract134 claim against Google, seeking injunctive relief.135 Search King
argued that PageRanks are objectively verifiable, noting that the PageRank
system is patented and that since ideas cannot be patented, PageRank must
be “objective in nature, and therefore capable of being proven true or

131. Search King, Inc., slip op. at 1.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id. at 2–3.
134. To prevail on a tortious interference with contract claim under Oklahoma state law,
the plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the defendant interfered with one of the
plaintiff’s a business or contractual relationships, (2) the interference was malicious and
wrongful, without excuse or justification, and (3) the interference was a proximate cause for
an injury suffered by the plaintiff. Id. at 4; see also Daniels v. Union Baptist Ass’n, 2001
OK 63, 55 P.3d 1012, 1015 (Okla. 2001) (listing the elements necessary to establish a cause
of action for malicious interference with contract or business relations under Oklahoma state
law).
135. Search King, Inc., slip op. at 3.
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false.”136 Search King argued that its lowered PageRank score was
therefore a provably false statement made by Google. Google responded
that PageRank consists of opinions entitled to First Amendment protection
and that Google was therefore shielded from tort liability.137
The court ultimately agreed with Google, finding that PageRank
consisted of “constitutionally protected opinions.”138 The court explained
that although the PageRank algorithm certainly has an objective nature, the
algorithm was not at issue; rather, it was the subjective result produced by
the algorithm that Search King was contesting.139 The court distinguished
between process and result.140 The process by which Google arranges its
search results is through the PageRank algorithm, which is objective.141
However, the result is the actual PageRank, or the numerical representation
of the significance of a website, which the court found to be
“fundamentally subjective in nature.”142 Since PageRank consists merely
of opinions on the relevance of certain websites, there is no way to prove
that the PageRank of a given website is false, and the court thus concluded
that PageRank was entitled to “full constitutional protection.”143
2. Langdon v. Google, Inc.
The second case accusing Google of search engine manipulation was
Langdon v. Google, Inc., a case decided by the District of Delaware in
2007. 144 The plaintiff argued that Google had a duty to carry his
advertisements, which charged North Carolina government officials with
fraud and the Chinese government with committing various atrocities.145
The plaintiff argued that Google’s refusal to run his advertisements and
Google’s alleged removal of his websites from certain search queries
(which allegedly hurt his ranking on other search engines) violated his First
Amendment rights.146 He further alleged violations of Delaware law
through fraud, breach of contract, and deceptive business practices.147
In response, Google argued that the injunctive relief sought by the

136. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 6.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 7 (quoting Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s
Services, Inc., 175 F. 3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999)).
144. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626 (D. Del. 2007).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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plaintiff would compel Google to speak in a manner that would violate
Google’s own First Amendment rights.148 The court agreed, explaining that
the First Amendment guarantees not only the right to speak, but also the
right not to speak.149 On this ground, the court granted Google’s motion to
dismiss the complaint.150 The court also held that Google was immunized
from the plaintiff’s claims under section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, which reads in relevant part:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.151
Analogizing Google to a publisher, entitled to editorial discretion in
“deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content” as it
sees fit, the court ruled in favor of Google. 152 In rejecting the plaintiff’s
argument that section 230 was inapplicable because his ads were not
obscene or harassing, the court held that Google’s refusal to run the
plaintiff’s ads fell under the “otherwise objectionable” prong of section 230
and was therefore protected against suit.153
The court further held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim that
Google had violated his First Amendment right to free speech because
Google is a “private, for profit” company, “not subject to constitutional free
speech guarantees.”154 Rather, Google is a search engine that “uses the
internet as a medium to conduct business.”155 The plaintiff’s argument that
Google was a state actor because it worked with state universities was
found “specious.”156 The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
there was a sufficient nexus between Google and the State that Google’s
actions could fairly be treated as those of the State itself.157 Because
Google was not a state actor, it could not be found to have violated the

148. Id. at 629-30.
149. Id. The first Amendment protects not only the right to speak, but also the right not
to speak. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that
compelling schoolchildren to salute the flag violated their First Amendment right not to
speak).
150. Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 629-30.
151. Id. at 630 (quoting the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)
(2006)) (emphasis added).
152. Id. (quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).
153. Id. at 630-31.
154. Id. at 631.
155. Id.
156. Id. The state action doctrine will be discussed more thoroughly in Part IV.A.3.
157. Id. at 631-32.
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plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.158
The plaintiff’s claim that Google engaged in deceptive business
practice was also dismissed. The dismissal, however, was due to a failure
to allege that the acts at issue took place in Delaware, an essential element
of the Delaware state law claim for deceptive trade practices.159 The court
did not substantively conclude that Google had not engaged in deceptive
business practices. This leaves open the possibility for a future deceptive
business practices claim against Google, as long as the jurisdictional
requirements of the claim are met.
3. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc.
The third case alleging Google search engine manipulation was
KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc.,160 discussed earlier in Part III.B.1 of
this Comment. To briefly summarize, KinderStart was an Internet website
that enrolled in Google’s AdSense program, under which it would pay
Google for a series of sponsored links.161 Two years later, KinderStart
suffered a significant reduction in monthly page views and traffic and
subsequently realized that common search terms on Google’s search engine
no longer listed KinderStart as a result as prominently as it had done in the
past.162 KinderStart’s PageRank dropped to a zero, the lowest PageRank a
website can receive.163 In 2006, KinderStart filed suit against Google,
alleging, inter alia, freedom of speech violations under the United States
and California Constitutions, deceptive business practices under California
state law, and defamation.164
158. Id. at 632.
159. Id. at 633-34 (referring to Delaware’s Consumer Protection Act, 6 DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6 §§ 2501-2598 (1953)). Although Google was successful in having most of Plaintiff’s
claims dismissed, the court denied Google’s motion to dismiss on Plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim, finding that Plaintiff adequately alleged such a claim, which requires
establishing: (1) that a contract existed, (2) that Google breached an obligation imposed by
the contract, and (3) that the breach resulted in damage to Plaintiff. Langdon, 474 F. Supp.
2d at 632 (citing VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del.
2003)).
160. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
161. Id. at 4.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 5.
164. Id. at 2. In the first amended complaint, KinderStart alleged nine claims for relief:
(1) freedom of speech violations under the United States and California Constitutions, (2)
attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act, (3) monopolization under the Sherman
Act, (4) violations of the Communications Act, (5) unfair competition under California state
law, (6) prior discrimination under California state law, (7) breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, (8) defamation and libel, and (9) negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage. First Amended Complaint, KinderStart.com LLC v.
Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82481 (N.D. Cal. July 13,
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First, KinderStart argued that Google violated the California Business
and Professions Code by engaging in unlawful business practices,
including PageRank deflation and blockage of competitors’ websites.165
The court rejected this claim, explaining that KinderStart failed to identify
“specific terms of the AdSense agreement that are deceptive” and also
failed to indicate how the agreement was deceptive.166 However, this ruling
was specific to the AdSense agreement between KinderStart and Google
and was grounded in the technical issue of pleading requirements, as
opposed to a substantive conclusion that Google does not engage in
deceptive business practices.167 Thus, the court left open the possibility for
a deceptive business practices claim by consumers alleging manipulative
practices in the search process, rather than by website operators suing on
their unhappy with their AdSense agreements.
Second, KinderStart alleged defamation against Google based on
Google’s public presentation of KinderStart.com as having a PageRank of
zero.168 Under California state law, defamation exists “whenever a false
and unprivileged statement which has a natural tendency to injure or which
causes special damage is communicated to one or more persons who
understand its defamatory meaning and its application to the injured
party.”169 To prevail on its defamation claim, KinderStart had to allege a
provably false statement.170 KinderStart argued that the PageRank assigned
to its website was a false statement because its website retained relevance,
and a PageRank assignment of zero was “mathematically impossible within
the normal operation”171 of PageRank. In sum, KinderStart argued that
KinderStart was harmed by Google’s false statement “that Google had
determined objectively that the KinderStart website was not worth
visiting.”172
However, the court found that KinderStart failed to adequately allege
that Google actually represented its PageRank algorithm as “objective” and
therefore dismissed the claim, since if Google represented PageRank as a

2006) [hereinafter KinderStart FAC]. The Northern District of California delivered an order
ruling on these claims on July 13, 2006. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal.
July 13, 2006). Most claims were dismissed with leave to amend. Because the KinderStart
II opinion frequently references analysis in KinderStart I to support its decision to dismiss
KinderStart’s claims, usually without leave to amend, both opinions will be referenced.
165. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip op. at 26.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 27.
169. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 9 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 28.
172. Id.

2013]

SEARCHING FOR AN ANSWER

321

subjective opinion, there could be no defamation claim.173 This leaves open
the possibility that, with sufficient evidence showing that Google
represents PageRank as a purely objective algorithm, a plaintiff could
plausibly allege a defamation claim based on an assignment of a zero
PageRank to its website.
KinderStart also alleged that Google violated its First Amendment174
rights by blocking search engine results from showing KinderStart’s
website content, and further alleging that its website consequently suffered
“irreparable harm in the suppression of [its] thoughts, facts, opinions,
information, and communications that should have otherwise been accessed
and received . . . .”175 However, a demonstration of state action is a
necessary prerequisite to any First Amendment claim.176 In the case of
private-party defendants, plaintiffs must show that the defendant’s
infringement constituted state action.177 In its case against Google,
KinderStart alleged three theories of state action: (1) entwinement, (2) a
symbiotic relationship with the government, and (3) public forum.178
The test for whether there is state action under the entwinement theory
is whether there is a “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action . . . that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself.”179 KinderStart argued that Google was sufficiently
entwined with the government because of its digital library projects,180
which digitally archived at least one state-owned university library and
which also supported a project by the Library of Congress.181 In evaluating
this claim, the court compared the case to Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association,182 where entwinement
was found. In Brentwood, eighty-four percent of a private association’s
members were public schools, which provided significant financial support
for the association.183 Additionally, the state appointed members to the
governing body of the private association, and association employees
173. Id. at 28-30.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”). KinderStart also alleged violations of its freedom of speech rights under the
California Constitution, which is more protective and inclusive than the United States
Constitution.
175. KinderStart FAC, supra note 164, ¶¶ 107, 108.
176. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip op. at 20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
177. Id. (citing George v. Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996)).
178. Id. at 20-21.
179. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
180. For an explanation of Google’s digital library project, see Google Books Library
Project—An Enhanced Card Catalog of the World’s Books, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
181. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 8 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006).
182. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
183. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 8.
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participated in the state retirement system.184 In comparing KinderStart’s
case to Brentwood, the court found that KinderStart fell far short of
establishing a “sufficiently close nexus” between Google and the state, and
therefore found no state action under the entwinement theory.185
KinderStart also alleged that there was a symbiotic relationship
between Google and the government.186 If a private entity confers
significant financial benefits to the government that are indispensable to the
government’s financial success, then a symbiotic relationship may be
established.187 The court rejected this theory with little to no analysis,
however, because KinderStart failed to allege a symbiotic relationship
between Google and the State “with respect to the activities that form[ed]
the basis of the [Second Amended Complaint].”188 The facts that
KinderStart alleged to support its symbiotic relationship theory were
Google’s digital library projects, which were not of concern in the
complaint.189 The complaint only concerned PageRank and the listing of
Google’s search engine results.
The third theory KinderStart pursued was the public forum theory.
KinderStart argued that the Google search engine is a public forum because
“[a]nyone with Internet access [could] go to [Google’s] own website or any
number of thousands of other Websites having a ‘Google Search Box’ as
provided by Google to use the Engine without payment or charge . . .
Google has willfully dedicated the Engine for public use.”190 KinderStart
further alleged:
Defendant Google created and now manages, with the largest
search engine in history, a freely accessible, nationwide public
forum for the exchange and flow of Speech Content by virtue of
the Engine. Defendant Google has intentionally, willfully and
openly dedicated the Engine for public use and public benefit.
Defendant Google, by and through the Engine, is a speech
intermediary.191
The court began its analysis by noting there was no precedent to
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.; see also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)
(holding that actions by a private lessee who leased space for a restaurant from a state
parking authority in a publicly owned building constituted state action).
187. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip op. at 22 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“In
a symbiotic relationship the government has ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence (with a private entity) that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity.’” (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 725).
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 22-23.
190. KinderStart SAC, supra note 91, ¶ 91.
191. Id. ¶ 251.
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support KinderStart’s claim that “a search engine was a public forum for
speech merely because it gives consumers the ability to find speech on the
Internet.”192 The court explained that a private space does not become a
public forum simply because it is used for speech.193 Rather, the point of
inquiry must focus on the manner in which a forum is used.194 Other
considerations in the analysis include the nature of the “property” at issue
(in this case, the Internet) and the disruption that might be caused by the
speaker’s activities.195
However, the court did not provide much
clarification on this analysis, perhaps because there exists little to no
authority for the court to cite on how to determine whether “property” on
the web constitutes a public forum or not.
B. The “Transmission of Speech” Theory
An interesting part of KinderStart’s public forum argument can be
found in its characterization of Google as a “speech intermediary.”196
KinderStart argued that access to Internet speech through Google’s search
engine warrants treating it as a public forum. 197 As indicated above, the
court dismissed this argument as lacking any merit since there was no
precedential authority to support it.198
KinderStart’s characterization of Google does not do much to support
its public forum analysis. However, such a characterization could gain
traction in arguing that Google search engine results really are not speech
at all. While it is widely recognized that speech is generally entitled to
government protection under the First Amendment, it is less clear whether
the mere transmission of speech, an action done by “speech
intermediaries,” would be entitled to those same First Amendment
protections.199
This raises the following question:
Under what
circumstances is the mere transmission of speech encompassed by the
“freedom of speech” protected under the First Amendment?
Professor Stuart Benjamin, professor of law at Duke University
School of Law, argues that if search engines merely transmit speech, then
they are not protected under the First Amendment and thus the government

192. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip
op. at 23 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
193. Id. at 23.
194. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
195. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800.
196. KinderStart FAC, supra note 164, ¶ 104.
197. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip op. at 22-23.
198. Id. at 23.
199. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining
What “The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1682-95 (2011).
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is free to regulate these search engines however they see fit.200 Thus,
KinderStart could have used its characterization of Google as a “speech
intermediary” not to argue that Google engages in state action, but rather,
that Google does not engage in “speech” at all, and thus is not entitled to
any First Amendment protections. KinderStart alleged that Google
represents its search engine as nothing more than an objective algorithm. 201
If this is the case, then KinderStart should have argued that Google does
not actually “speak” when it returns search results in response to search
queries, and that it does not actually “speak” when it assigns a numerical
PageRank score representing the relevance of a given website. Rather,
Google merely “transmits” speech by entering input it is given from users
into a computer algorithm, which then automatically returns results that
represent an objective product of an objective formula.202 If this were the
case, Google would not be expressing itself in any way that can be
analogized to speech; it would be merely acting as a short-cut for searchers
to obtain access more easily to speech. To illustrate this theory, Professor
Benjamin offers the following analogy:
Imagine that FedEx decided to speed up the delivery of
documents addressed to companies with which it had a financial
relationship; that is, FedEx would give preferential treatment in
its delivery schedule to documents sent to companies that paid it
for the privilege. A congressional decision to ban such a practice
may or may not be good policy, but it would not seem to raise
First Amendment issues. Yes, FedEx would be moving First

200. See generally id. (arguing that bare transmission of speech, while doing nothing
more, does not constitute speech entitled to First Amendment protections); see also id. at
1695–96 (“[A] company’s nondiscriminatory transportation (of bits or anything else)
enables communication, but it has no content, and thus expresses no ideas . . . so regulations
prohibiting discrimination in transmission do not, without more, trigger application of the
Free Speech Clause.”). This Comment refers to this theory as the “transmission of speech”
theory. However, this theory has also been referred to as the “conduit theory,” suggesting
that search engines are to be regarded as conduits that simply exist to carry the speech of
others. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 117. Proponents of this theory argue that
search engines are not “means of speech” like printing presses or cable networks, but rather,
are “selection intermediaries” that direct users to third party speech. See, e.g., Jennifer A.
Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet,
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2007) (discussingProfessor Jerome Barron’s argument that
the freedom of speech “should encompass a right of access to the media”); see also Bracha
& Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1199 (“[S]earch engine rankings play a central instrumental
role in facilitating effective speech by others.”).
201. See, e.g., KinderStart SAC, supra note 91, ¶ 2 (“Defendant Google . . . promotes
itself as delivering . . . unblocked objective results emerging out of millions of websites in
the United States and worldwide . . . .”).
202. Benjamin, supra note 199, at 1685 (“[A]nalogical reasoning highlights the
implausibility of an interpretation of the Free Speech Clause that bare transmission is
speech.”).
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Amendment-protected materials—documents—from one user to
another, but it is hard to see how transporting documents turns a
company into a speaker for First Amendment purposes.203
In the same way, Google could be seen not as actually speaking, but as
“transporting” speech from the web to the user.
However persuasive one may find this analogy, Professor Benjamin’s
transmission of speech theory is ultimately inapplicable to Google search
for two reasons. First, Google does far more than merely “transmit”
speech. For example, Google innovations such as the OneBox and Google
Now do not merely “transmit” speech; they provide direct responses to a
search query.204 These results are Google’s actual “speech.” They consist
of content that Google creates to respond to specific search terms (or in
Google Now’s case, on Google’s own accord); they do not merely
“transmit” speech from other websites through a display of hyperlinks.
Even assuming that Google returned to the “ordinary search” world
where it only listed hyperlinks in response to search queries, there is a
second reason the transmission theory fails—it ignores the Search King
distinction between process and result.205 In a way, it is true that Google
simply transmits speech when it displays hyperlinks of other websites in
response to a search query. However, Google employees choose what
factors their objective algorithms, like PageRank, should consider—such as
title tags, keywords, the importance of websites containing links pointing to
the destination website, the frequency of the search terms’ occurrence on
the website, whether synonyms of the search terms appear on the page, and
many others.206 Google employees also decide how much weight the
algorithms should give each factor in determining what websites to display.
Thus, while Google may appear to merely transmit speech when it displays
websites in response to a search query, this looks only to the process by
which Google speaks, and ignores the subjective result of the algorithm,
which is Google’s opinion on the significance of each website. Google’s
opinions on what factors should be considered determine the ultimate
result. In this way, we are brought back full circle to the Search King
opinion and find that Google search results are not merely instances of
transmitted speech; they are speech themselves in the form of opinions by
Google, opinions entitled to constitutional protection.207
To be sure, Search King is not the only case that has held opinions to
be constitutionally protected speech. For example, in Castle Rock
203. Id. at 1685.
204. See supra Part I.B (discussing Google OneBox).
205. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, slip op. at 6 (W.D.
Okla. May 27, 2003).
206. See supra Part I.A (explaining PageRank).
207. Search King, Inc., slip op. at 7.
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Remodeling, LLC v. Better Business Bureau of Greater St. Louis, Inc., the
Eastern District of Missouri dismissed a retailer’s defamation claim against
the Better Business Bureau for statements in one of its reports on the basis
that those statements were constitutionally protected opinions.208 Similarly,
the Western District of Washington dismissed a claim that a website which
ranked attorneys violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act
because the court held that those rankings were constitutionally protected
opinions.209 Thus, the “transmission of speech” theory is ultimately an
insufficient tool for plaintiffs challenging Google search engine
manipulation and, more importantly, PageRanks are constitutionally
protected opinions that do not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of
other websites.
C. Fact-Based Opinions
Even accepting the premise that Google PageRanks are opinions and
not statements of fact, some scholars maintain that Google can still be held
liable for assigning a low PageRank to a particular website.210 For
example, Google represents its algorithms as ranking results based only on
what is most relevant to users.211 Some scholars argue that Google is free
to establish its own criteria to enter into its algorithms for determining what
is relevant to users, but once the criteria is established, Google is not free to
disregard the results of the algorithm. Professor James Grimmelmann
notes that if Google were to lower the original PageRank its algorithm
assigned to a website, the new, altered PageRank would be a “false
statement of fact” and such false statements of fact could subject Google to
liability.212 Professor Grimmelmann cites the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. to point out that the mere fact that a
statement is held out as an “opinion” does not shield the speaker from
liability.213 As the Court in Milkovich explained:
For instance, the statement, “I think Jones lied,” may be provable
as false on two levels. First, that the speaker really did not think
208. 354 S.W.3d 234 (E.D. Mo. 2011).
209. Browne v. Avvo, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (W.D. Wa. 2007).
210. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 117, at 1 (proposing the “advisor theory” of
liability).
211. The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6-7 (2011) (statement of Eric Schmidt, Executive
Chairman of Google).
212. Grimmelmann, supra note 117, at 52.
213. 497 U.S. 1 (1990); see also Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495,
1527 (2013) (“Holding that any communication is protected speech if it can be called an
‘opinion’ is hopelessly overbroad.”).
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Jones had lied but said it anyway, and second that Jones really
had not lied. It is, of course, the second level of falsity which
would ordinarily serve as the basis for a defamation action,
though falsity at the first level may serve to establish malice
where that is required for recovery.214
Professor Grimmelmann analogizes this passage to search rankings. He
explains that if a Google algorithm assigned a low PageRank to a website
because the criteria used in the algorithm suggested the website to be less
relevant than other websites, then such a PageRank would be a nonfalsifiable statement that Google could not be held liable for.215 However,
Google could be held liable for a first-level statement, which would exist
where Google’s algorithm assigns a high PageRank to a website and a
Google engineer then manually lowers the PageRank, even if the engineer
believed the website relevant (for example, if Google lowered the
PageRank of a website simply because the website was operated by one of
its direct competitors).216 Therefore, although the PageRank of a website
can be categorized as Google’s “opinion” of a website, it is a “fact-based
opinion” that, notwithstanding its status as an opinion, would subject
Google to liability if it did not actually represent how “relevant” Google’s
algorithm found the website to be.217
V.

A NEW THEORY OF GOOGLE “SPEECH”

In reviewing the cases and theories detailed above, the state of the law
surrounding search engine manipulation appears to be as follows: (1)
Google rankings of how websites appear in search results are
constitutionally protected opinions,218 though some suggest these opinions
are protected only if they are not further manipulated by Google engineers
after the algorithm has produced a ranking,219 (2) Google is a private entity,
not a state actor, and therefore cannot be guilty of violating First
Amendment protections of other parties,220 and (3) Google cannot be found

214. 497 U.S. at 20 n.7.
215. See Grimmelmann, supra note 117, at 55 (arguing that the FTC’s investigation
finding Google without fault was correct).
216. Id. at 51.
217. Id. (“If a rating agency knowingly issues a rating that is either unsupported by
reasoned analysis or without a factual foundation, it is stating a fact-based opinion that it
does not believe to be true.” (quoting Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., No. 08-cv-07508, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119671 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2012))).
218. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006); Search King, Inc.
v. Google Tech, Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
219. Grimmelmann, supra note 117; supra Part IV.C.
220. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626 (D. Del. 2007); KinderStart I,
No. C 06-2057 JF (RS).
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guilty of monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act because there
is no “relevant market” for antitrust purposes that Google can be found to
be monopolizing, and further, Google does not engage in anticompetitive
conduct by lowering the PageRank of websites.221
Does this mean that Google is entirely shielded from suits alleging
search engine manipulation? Not exactly. A review of the cases above
will show that there are two claims that can still be plausibly alleged
against Google, if more adequately pleaded: (1) deceptive business
practices under relevant state law and (2) defamation under relevant state
law. Based on the courts’ analyses above, a plaintiff could allege that
Google engages in deceptive business practices under relevant state law
(the California Business and Professions Code, for example) by
representing its search results as objective representations of the most
relevant websites for the search terms entered, when in fact, Google
manipulates them by inputting its subjective opinions. For example,
Google could prioritize its own products and services by representing its
own websites as the most relevant and competitors’ websites as less
relevant. Second, a plaintiff could allege a defamation claim against
Google if Google unjustifiably lowered its PageRank and if, as explained
above, Google made representations to the public that its PageRank
assignment to websites was an objective determination of the relevance of a
website, free of human manipulation and subjective influence.
If a plaintiff were to make these claims, a court, if using the analyses
the courts gave in Search King, Langdon, and KinderStart, would likely
allow these claims to survive a motion to dismiss. However, in all three of
those cases, the “speech” attributed to Google that was being evaluated was
always either (1) the numerical PageRank score Google assigns to websites
or (2) the entire SERP, i.e., the ranking of websites in response to a search
query. It is both curious and unfortunate that there is such a wealth of
scholarship discussing Google search engine manipulation claims, yet very
little of that scholarship devotes any attention to discussing what the actual
“speech” at issue is. I propose a new theory of Google speech to raise
attention to this paucity.
If Google continues to face claims of search engine manipulation, as it
likely will, it should argue that the Google speech at issue is not the
PageRank of a website or the appearance of a SERP. Rather, the display of
each individual search result should be treated as an individual
recommendation Google is making to us. In other words, when we conduct
Google searches, we are having a conversation with Google. By entering
search terms into a Google search bar, we are asking Google a question,
such as, “What are good sushi restaurants to try?” In response, Google
221. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS).
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answers us in question format. Each individual search result is a response
posed in question format by Google, asking us, “Is this what you are
looking for?” By clicking on a search result, I am answering Google’s
question by responding “yes, this is what I am looking for.” I argue that by
interpreting Google “speech” in this way, many of the legal objections to
Google search engine manipulation will be far more difficult to allege and
government regulation will similarly be more difficult to justify.
I call this theory of speech the “recommendation theory,” because
Google treats each individual search result as a recommendation by
Google—Google is recommending websites to the user based on the user’s
search query. There would be no representation that the first search result
is objectively the most relevant website, but simply a representation of
what Google, in its own subjective opinion, would recommend to the user.
By adopting this recommendation theory, a plaintiff can no longer
argue that Google is unfairly prioritizing allegedly less relevant websites
(Google’s own websites) over competitor’s websites because there is a new
understanding that neither PageRank nor the ranking of Google’s search
results is purporting to represent an objective statement of fact or, as
Professor Grimmelmann has put it, a “fact-based opinion.” Rather, Google
is listing websites simply in the order of what it would like to recommend,
and recommendations cannot be treated as objective. Google is a speaker
that responds to our questions—our “questions” come in the form of search
terms and Google’s “answers” come in the form of recommendations. The
mere fact that Google, in this sense, is a computer algorithm, as opposed to
an actual person, cannot deny Google search the right to freedom of speech
rights. For example, video games can be considered “speakers” that
“speak,” and that speech is entitled to First Amendment rights.222 Thus,
while the question posed in the title of Professor Tim Wu’s New York
Times article, Free Speech for Computers?, is humorous, it ignores the
current state of the law—that the application of First Amendment rights to
a speaker does not depend on whether or not that speaker is a human.223
This “recommendation theory” of Google speech would allow Google
to avoid many of the claims alleged in Search King, Langdon, and
KinderStart, as well as Professor Grimmelman’s fact-based opinion theory.
One could hardly argue that Google is required to recommend websites of
its competitors. For example, if a friend asked me to recommend a bakery
222. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 (2011).
223. See Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at A29
(discussing an argument for protecting computer speech based on the theory that the
computer inherits the programmer’s rights). Of course, this is a simplified version of the
argument. Video games are not actually the “speakers”; their programmers are. Similarly,
search engines are not actually the “speakers” either; their programmers are, which is what
Professor Wu is actually referring to in the text of his article.
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and my mother happens to run a bakery, I am entitled to recommend my
mother’s bakery to my friend, and such a recommendation is not
interpreted as an objective statement of fact that her bakery is the best. Nor
could such a recommendation be treated as a “fact-based opinion” capable
of being falsified. Similarly, Google can recommend its own proprietary
services first by listing its vertical search engine results at the top of a
SERP, and that should not be treated as a statement of fact that Google’s
services are the most relevant. Rather, it simply means that Google highly
recommends its own services, which of course, is not unlawful. It would
be nonsensical to argue that recommending one’s own products and
services would be a violation of standard business practices under any state
law, such as the California Business and Professions Code in KinderStart.
Therefore, the recommendation theory would allow search engines like
Google to evade antitrust claims and deceptive business practices claims.
Further, it would make little sense to say that Google’s failure to
highly recommend a competitor’s website (by assigning a low PageRank to
the website) could constitute defamation. The mere fact that Google does
not give a strong recommendation for one of its competitor’s products (for
example, by assigning its competitor’s website a low PageRank or pushing
the competitor’s website to the bottom of a SERP) could not constitute
defamation because a failure to recommend a competitor does not
constitute a false statement of fact. I could hardly be liable for defamation
of my competitor simply for failing to recommend my competitor’s product
to the public. Therefore, the recommendation theory would allow Google
to escape liability for defamation claims it faces from websites suing
Google for assigning them a low PageRank. In sum, the recommendation
theory would allow Google to dodge claims that Search King, Langdon,
and KinderStart left it exposed to—antitrust, deceptive business practices,
and defamation.
CONCLUSION
Search engine speech is a murky, unsettled area of law. The Supreme
Court has not yet adjudicated whether search engine manipulation violates
federal antitrust laws or whether search engines are entitled to First
Amendment protection. Further, the recent FTC investigation failed to
resolve the legal debate surrounding these legal issues, since very little
evidence was publicized and little to no legal analysis was provided to
justify the settlement. To no surprise, Google’s opponents were unhappy
after the settlement, accusing the FTC of missing a golden opportunity to
enforce antitrust laws against Google.224
224. The FTC’s Missed Opportunity on Google, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2013, 3:05 PM),
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In this Comment, I have argued that Google search engine
manipulation does not violate federal antitrust laws and that search engines
like Google are entitled to First Amendment protection. Google has the
right to produce search results in whatever order it pleases, regardless of
whether it is driven by innocent reasons, such as wishing to better serve the
user, or less innocent reasons, such as wishing to boost its own products
and services. Although demoting the ranking of websites has the effect of
diverting traffic away from these websites, thereby denying those websites
potential revenue, those websites never had a right to that revenue because
they have no right to a space on Google’s platform. Thus, Google is not
denying them anything they were ever entitled to.
I have also argued that any attempt to force Google to promote its
competitors’ websites would be compelled speech, and thus government
regulation aimed at controlling the way in which Google ranks its search
results would violate the First Amendment. After analyzing cases in which
Google raised the First Amendment as a defense against search engine
manipulation claims, I have argued that current understandings of what
constitutes Google “speech” for First Amendment purposes are flawed. In
response, I have proposed a new way of understanding Google “speech”
through the recommendation theory, which, if adopted, will more
adequately defend Google against the many claims it continues to face in
court. I hope that with this proposal, Google will be able to spend less time
in court defending its search practices, and more time out of court doing
what it does best: innovating online search.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/the-ftc-s-missed-opportunity-on-google.html.

